In a model of competing managerial .rms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier theoretical contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.
Introduction
Models where risk-neutral …rms compete in prices predict that greater uncertainty about marginal costs spurs entry. This is because pro…t functions are convex in prices, and (expected) prices are increasing with respect to cost volatility. Yet, the empirical evidence seems to support the opposite view. Using data on U.S. manufacturing industries over a 30-year period, Ghosal (1996) shows that greater uncertainty has a negative impact on the number of …rms.
To explain this puzzle the existing literature has mainly focused on risk aversion: …rms characterized by more risk aversion prefer not to operate in markets featuring high price uncertainty. But, these models are unable to provide unambiguous and easily testable predictions (e.g., Appelbaum and Katz, 1986, and Haruna, 1996) , and even when they do provide clear-cut results, these are not in line with the evidence (e.g., Jellal and Wol¤, 2005) . Moreover, these models usually neglect agency issues and are mute on the interplay between managerial rents, corporate control and entry I thank Denis Gromb, Riccardo Martina and David Martimort for many useful discussions on related topics. Errors are mine y Corresponding address: Salvatore Piccolo, Department of Economics, Via Cintia Monte S. Angelo, Università di Napoli Federico II, I-80126 Napoli, Italy. E-mail: salvapiccolo@gmail.com 1 decisions. Modern …rms, even small companies, usually feature agency problems that shape managerial incentives and, in turn, the industry structure. What are the drivers of managerial …rms' entry and exit decisions? What is the impact of organizational and contractual rules on industry structure?
To address these issues, I analyze a simple managerial model linking entry decisions, corporate control and uncertainty. My purpose is to emphasize that, even under risk neutrality, a negative relationship between entry and uncertainty obtains when asymmetric information plagues the con ‡ict between management and control. In a model where pricing, corporate control and entry decisions are determined endogenously, the e¤ect of uncertainty on the equilibrium number of …rms is shaped by the relative magnitude of monitoring and entry costs. Using a simple quadratic setting where managers are privately informed about marginal costs of production, I show that if monitoring costs are smaller than entry costs, the equilibrium number of …rms is decreasing in a measure of uncertainty, and the converse obtains otherwise.
One main trade-o¤ shapes this result. First, greater uncertainty increases the average market price and this spurs entry because sales pro…ts are convex in prices: a price e¤ ect. Second, greater uncertainty spurs the information rent that shareholders need to give up in order to induce truthful information revelation. And the greater is this rent, the lower are total pro…ts: a rent e¤ ect.
The net e¤ect depends on the relative magnitude of entry and monitoring costs. If entry costs are larger than monitoring costs, the rent e¤ect dominates: more uncertainty spurs information rents and entry becomes more costly because shareholders get lower returns from their initial investment. Conversely, if monitoring costs are larger than entry costs, the price e¤ect dominates.
When monitoring is very costly shareholders have little control on managers: the only way to reduce the costly information rents is to distort upward the price in bad technological states, so as to make mimicking less pro…table. This distortion magni…es price dispersion and strengthens the positive e¤ect of uncertainty on entry.
This result is novel in the theoretical debate on competition and incentives and o¤ers simple testable predictions on the link between entry and uncertainty, whereby providing ready to use guidelines for future empirical work.
The model
Consider a Salop (1979) setting where n …rms position themselves symmetrically around a circle, whose perimeter is normalized to 1. The cost of entry is F . Firms produce the same product and compete in prices. The circle is populated by a continuum of consumers with a uniform density of 1. Each consumer buys one unit of the good. If a consumer located at x 2 (z i ; z i+1 ) purchases from …rm i located at z i , his utility is
where v is the reserve price of each consumer -i.e., the utility of consuming the most preferred variety x -and tx is the (linear) disutility associated with consuming this variety.
Following the literature (e.g., Hart, 1983 , Schmidt, 1997 , and Raith, 2003 I assume that each …rm features separation between ownership and control. Shareholders (principals) own all productive assets but lack the required expertise in managing them, so they need to employ self-interested managers (agents) to run business in their behalf. Managers set prices and collect pro…ts, which are then distributed to shareholders.
Production technologies are linear: marginal costs are determined by the realization of a random variable e i 2 = ; , with Pr ( ) = and = > 0 for all i. Managers privately observe marginal costs and are protected by limited liability.
Shareholders hire managers before production occurs and uncertainty is resolved, they have full bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. I use the Revelation Principle to characterize the set of incentive feasible allocations: once uncertainty is resolved, a message game takes place within each …rm. A managerial contract C i speci…es an allocation rule determining: (i) the …nal price, p i , (ii) the dividend to shareholders, D i , and (iii) an auditing scheme, featuring a monitoring probability, i , and and a (monetary) punishment, P i , enforced in case a lie is detected. Auditing the manager is expensive and it costs c ( i ) to shareholders. I shall interpret the probability of monitoring i as a measure of monitoring (corporate control) intensity.
Shareholders can fully commit to a costly state veri…cation policy, the contract C i is a mechanism
, and an auditing probability, i (m i ), all contingent on manager i's report m i . The contract also speci…es a punishment P i ( i ), contingent on the realized state of nature, which is enforced whenever i 6 = m i . Upon receiving the message m i , shareholders audit the manager with probability i (m i ), discover the state i and, if a lie is detected, the punishment P i ( i ) is in ‡icted to the manager.
The game unfolds as follows,
-T = 0. Shareholders decide whether to enter the market. If so, the entry cost F is paid.
-T = 1. Shareholders secretly propose contracts to managers. If an o¤er is rejected, both parties enjoy an outside option normalized to zero.
-T = 2. Uncertainty resolves and a communication game takes place within each …rm: managers report their private information, set prices and product market competition takes place.
-T=3. Pro…ts materialize, shareholders audit managers, dividends and punishments (if any) are collected.
Since contracts are secret, the equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with a "passive beliefs" re…nement: given an equilibrium where shareholders of …rm i o¤er the contract C e i (i = 1; ::n), when manager i is o¤ered an unexpected contract, say C 0 i 6 = C e i , he believes that rivals are o¤ered the same contracts -i.e., C j = C e j for every j 6 = i. I shall look for symmetric fully separating equilibria: …rms with the same cost charge the same …nal price -i.e., p i ( i ) = p j ( j )
Let p e ( i ) be …rm i's equilibrium price in state i . Consider then …rm i setting p i given that its neighbors charge the equilibrium prices p e ( j ), with j 2 fi + 1; i 1g. The location of the consumer that is indi¤erent between purchasing from …rm i or its neighbor i + 1, say x(p i ; p e ( e i+1 )), is then de…ned by the indi¤erence condition
By symmetry, …rm i's expected demand is then
where b p e =E e j [p e ( e j )] is the average equilibrium price. Manager i's utility is linear in wealth:
given state i and report m i . Shareholders are risk-neutral and maximize the expected dividend
I will make the following hypothesis: A1 The random variable e i takes values = 1 + and = 1 with equal probability. It has standard deviation 2 [0; 1], expected value 1, and support = 2 . The monitoring cost is quadratic: c ( ) = e 2 =2 with > 0.
So that e i re ‡ects an idiosyncratic shock to each …rm, while measures industry-wide uncertainty. Results will be derived for small to avoid corner solutions.
Complete information benchmark
When shareholders observe the cost realization of their own manager, but not those of the rivals' managers, the result is straightforward;
Lemma 1 Assume A1 and small. The equilibrium number of …rms is
Since …rms'sales pro…ts are convex in prices, greater uncertainty makes entry more pro…table.
Asymmetric information
Consider now asymmetric information. I look for a symmetric separating equilibrium of the game where: (i) shareholders o¤er contracts inducing truthful revelation by managers and that are best response one to another; (ii) managers participate the game and truthfully report their types; (iii) the equilibrium number of …rms is determined by the shareholders'(expected) zero pro…t condition.
This equilibrium outcome must satisfy few standard requirements.
First, manager i accepts contract C i if and only its participation constraint is met:
Moreover, he truthfully reports its type as long as C i satis…es incentive compatibility, i.e.,
Finally, since managers are protected by limited liability, the punishment P i ( i ) needs to satisfy the condition
implying that at the most the …rm cash ‡ow can be seized by shareholders when a lie is detected.
Then the equilibrium contract C e solves:
Standard techniques allow to show (see, e.g., La¤ont and Martimort, 2000) that the relevant incentive constraint is that of e¢ cient types, i.e.,
More e¢ cient managers mimic ine¢ cient ones simply because, by doing so, they save on production costs at the shareholders'expense. Hence, limited liability implies
Not that, in equilibrium there is no need to audit a manager who claims to be e¢ cient -i.e., i = 0. This is because the ine¢ cient type's incentive constraint is slack and auditing is costly.
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Finally, as standard, ine¢ cient managers get no rents (U i = 0) so that the punishment P i in the ine¢ cient state is irrelevant. Di¤erently, the punishment P i in the e¢ cient state is the largest possible given (5) , i.e.,
Hence,
This expression determines the information rent as a function of two endogenous variables: the monitoring intensity i and the price p i charged in the ine¢ cient state. The cost of inducing managers to tell the truth decreases the larger is the monitoring intensity (high i ) and the smaller is …rm i's expected demand in state . To reduce this rent shareholders will: (i) monitor managers claiming to be ine¢ cient with positive probability; (ii) distort upward relative to the complete information case the price p i .
Each principal's objective is therefore:
Optimizing with respect to prices and monitoring intensity, a symmetric equilibrium is identi…ed by the …rst-order conditions
As standard, low-cost managers price according to the e¢ cient rule, (expected) marginal revenues equalize marginal costs as stated by equation (6) . High cost managers, instead, are forced to set prices according to an ine¢ cient rule as implied by equation (7): shareholders realize that the information rent of the e¢ cient manager is larger the higher is demand when he mimics, so they request a larger price in the bad state to reduce this rent. Finally, equation (8) states that the monitoring intensity is chosen so as to equalize marginal costs to marginal bene…ts, which are captured by the negative impact of a tighter control on rents.
The free entry condition is: 
6 This condition simply states that in a competitive equilibrium shareholders equalize sales pro…ts to total costs, which include managerial rents, monitoring costs and entry costs.
Using the parametric speci…cation in A1 and taking small, the solution of the system of equations (6)- (9) Larger cost volatility has two countervailing e¤ects on entry. First, greater uncertainty increases the average price and this encourages entry because sales pro…ts are convex in prices. Second, greater uncertainty spurs the information rents that owners need to give up in order to induce truthful information revelation. These greater rents sti ‡e pro…ts thereby making entry less pro…table.
Which e¤ect prevails depends on the relative magnitude of entry and monitoring costs. If the entry cost (F ) is larger than the monitoring cost ( ), the rent e¤ect dominates, greater uncertainty spurs information rents and entry becomes more costly: shareholders get lower returns from their sunk investment. Conversely, if the monitoring cost is larger than the entry cost, the price e¤ect dominates. This is because, when monitoring is very costly shareholders have little direct control on their managers: the only way to reduce the costly information rents is to distort upward the price in the bad state. This magni…es the equilibrium price dispersion and therefore strengthens the positive e¤ect of uncertainty on entry.
